

before, rather than after, the more general *quor . . . suggeris*.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, in the Kauer–Lindsay version of the passage, the asyndeton between *quor . . . suggeris* and *vestitu . . . indulges* is harsh, and we would expect either another *quor* or at least an *et*, but, metrically, there is room for neither.<sup>9</sup> The harshness of the missing *quor* or *et* is eliminated in the Marouzeau version of the passage, but *vestitu . . . indulges* becomes a weak, almost parenthetical, statement before what seems to be the real answer to Demea's rhetorical questions, *nimum ineptus es*.

The parallels *Heaut.* 861 (*nimum illi, Menedeme, indulges*) and *Eun.* 222 (*nimi' mihi*<sup>10</sup> *indulgeo*) suggest that, rather than *vestitu*, we should have here the dative of some pronoun referring to Aeschinus.<sup>11</sup> The simplest emendation would be to read *isti tu* for *vestitu*, but this emendation does not explain the initial *v* found in the manuscripts, and the use of *isti*, rather than *illi*

as in the parallel of *Heaut.* 861, is strange. It is possible that the text originally read *illi tu* and that some scribe, perhaps influenced by *iste tuos* (referring to Aeschinus) at 139, wrote *isti* as a variant reading introduced by an abbreviated *vel* (VL):<sup>12</sup>

VLISTI

ILLITV . . .

A second scribe, misinterpreting the variant reading as a correction, would have read *veistitu*<sup>13</sup> and would have "corrected" it to *vestitu*, possibly thinking of *discidit vestem: resarcietur* (120–21).<sup>14</sup> The *nimum* which we would expect from the parallel of *Heaut.* 861 would have been "corrected" in turn to *nimio* to agree with the dative or ablative *vestitu*. The original of 62–63 would have read:

*quor potat? quor tu his rebu' sumptum suggeris?*  
*illi tu nimum indulges: nimum ineptus es.*<sup>15</sup>

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8. It must be remembered that it is Micio who is quoting Demea. It would be out of keeping with the benign and civil character of Micio to move clauses out of their natural order and to make Demea sound illogical or silly, since such low humor would only distract the audience from Micio's purpose in quoting Demea, namely to describe Demea's concern for Aeschinus.

9. Nowhere else in either Terence or Plautus is one *quor* used to introduce two questions with different verbs without either an *et* or an *aut* joining the two questions. There are two such uses of *quid = quor* in Plautus (none in Terence): "sed quid ego hic properans concessio pedibus, lingua largior?" *Asin.* 290, and "sed quid ego hic in lamentando pereor, ad navim non eo?" *Merc.* 218. Neither of these cases is really parallel to the asyndeton at *Ad.* 62–63, which occurs at the end of a series of questions, each introduced by its own interrogative. Furthermore, in both cases in Plautus the two questions are sharply contrasted ("why do I do A instead of B?") in a way that *quor . . . suggeris* and *vestitu . . . indulges* are not.

10. *Mihi* is the reading of the manuscripts; Donatus (*ad loc.*) reads *me*, continuing: "sic veteres, quod nos 'mihi.' alibi [*Heaut.* 988] 'te indulgebant, tibi dabant.'" If Donatus means by this that *indulgeo* governed only the accusative in archaic

Latin, we should also read *illum* (rather than *illi*) at *Heaut.* 861 and in the emendation proposed below.

11. The use of both *sumptus* and *vestitus* in *Capt.* 322 ("me saturum servire apud te sumptu et vestitu tuo") is an inadequate reason for retaining *vestitu* in *Ad.* 63. The two passages are in fact quite different, with *vestitu* in *Ad.* 50 referring to clothing as an indulgence, while *vestitu* in *Capt.* 322 refers to clothing as a necessity (as, e.g., at *Heaut.* 968). Furthermore, *vestitu* and *sumptu* are closely linked in *Capt.* 322, while *vestitu* in *Ad.* 63 is, if anything, parallel to *his rebu'* (i.e., wenching and drinking) in *Ad.* 62, and not to *sumptum*.

12. For the use of abbreviated *vel* (vl) to introduce variant readings, see W. M. Lindsay, *An Introduction to Latin Textual Emendation* (London, 1896), p. 64.

13. Although vl is most frequently misread as *ut* (Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 97), an *l* with crossbar could be misread as *e* in many forms of rustic capitals (e.g., the *exemplum* given by E. M. Thompson, *A Handbook of Greek and Latin Palaeography*<sup>3</sup> [London, 1906], p. 188). The misreading of vl as *ve* is the most reasonable explanation of the Ambrosian palimpsest's reading of *vestiunt* for *sciunt* at *Plaut. Pers.* 6.

14. The *vestem* of 121 is Sannio's, not Aeschinus'.

15. I would like to thank the referee for his suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this note.

## THE BLIND BARD OF CHIOS (*HYMN. HOM. AP.* 171–76)

A natural misreading of *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 171–76 has led scholars into unnecessary confusion. The Hymn was ascribed to Homer in antiquity (Thuc. 3. 104; Aristid. Quint. 2. 558; Paus. 10. 37. 5; Steph. Byz. s.v. "Teumēssos"; Eustath. 1602. 25) and was

taken to include an autobiographical reference to his blindness (172). However, modern scholarship denies Homeric authorship and takes the Hymn to be by a different, but probably very early, bard. The most likely candidate is Cynaethus of Chios, "who first

recited the poems of Homer at Syracuse in the sixty-ninth Olympiad,” an ascription attributed to Hipponostratus by the scholiast *ad* Pind. *Nem.* 2. 2. The date 504 B.C. is manifestly too late, both for the Hymn and for the first rhapsodic recital of Homer in Syracuse, and is accepted as an error in transmission. The Hymn is by general agreement to be dated by its language and references as the earliest of the *Homeric Hymns*, probably as early as the eighth century. Athenaeus gives two possible ascriptions, to Homer or to one of the Homeridae: “Ὁμηρος ἢ τῶν Ὀμηριδῶν τις ἐν τῷ εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα ὕμνῳ (22C). It is reasonable to assume that Cynaethus of Chios is the Homerid referred to in the alternative ascription and to move his date backward from 504 B.C. to a date compatible with the poem. To quote the commentary in the edition of the *Hymns* by Allen–Halliday–Sikes: “Everything conspires with Hipponostratus’ statement that the hymn was by Cynaethus who first recited Homer in Syracuse, surely not long after its foundation in 733 B.C.” (pp. 185–86).

Thus the autobiographical reference to blindness at 172, formerly thought to prove that Homer was blind, is now understood to apply to the real author, Cynaethus. Without this evidence, Homeric scholars are disposed also to reject the ancient evidence that Homer was blind, arguing that it derives ultimately from the mistaken attribution of the Hymn to Homer. They agree with the delightfully crusty comment by Proclus: “Those who made him deprived of sight<sup>1</sup> seem to me themselves to have been deprived of their wits; for he saw so many sights as no man else ever saw” (τυφλὸν δὲ ὅσοι τοῦτον ἀπεφύναντο, αὐτοὶ μοι δοκοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν πεπηρώσθαι· τοσαῦτα γὰρ κατείδεν ὅσα οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος πώποτε, Wilamowitz, p. 27. 8–10).

Yet Proclus ignores the ancient testimony

that Homer was born seeing but either went blind or was blinded, which rests on independent evidence of the Colophonians<sup>2</sup> and on an alleged etymology for Ὀμηρος. The tradition that Homer became blind does not rest on the Hymn alone.

Most important, the conclusion that the author of the Hymn refers to himself is not inescapable and rests on a casual reading of this passage. The poet refers to himself several times in the first person singular: 1, 19, 546. At line 166 the poet asks the Deliades

ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθε  
μνήσασθ', ὅππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων  
ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ξείνος ταλαπείριος ἐλλών·  
ὦ κούραι, τίς δ' ὕμνιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιαιτος αἰδῶν  
ἐνθάδε πωλεῖται, καὶ τέω τέρπεσθε μάλαστα; 170  
ὑμεῖς δ' εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθ' ἀμφ' ἡμέων·  
τυφλὸς ἀνὴρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἐνὶ παιπαλοέσσει,  
τοῦ πᾶσαι μετόπισθεν ἀρστεύουσιν αἰοδαί.  
ἡμεῖς δ' ὑμέτερον κλέος οἴσμεν ὅσον ἐπ' αἶαν  
ἀνθρώπων στρεφόμεσθα πόλεις εὖ ναιεταώσας· 175  
οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δὴ πείσονται, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐτήτυμόν ἐστιν.  
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οὐ λήξω ἐκηβάλον Ἀπόλλωνα  
ὑμέων ἀργυρότοξον δι' ἥτοκος τέκε Λητώ.

Remember *me* in the future, whenever any mortal man comes here, a wandering stranger, and asks, “Maidens, who comes to you as the sweetest of bards and in whom do you find most joy?” All together, answer well about *us*, “A blind man, and he lives in rocky Chios; all his songs surpass those of others in time to come.” And *we* will bear your (*variant* our) praise to any land where *we* travel through the settled cities of men. And they will believe, for it is true. But *I* will not stop hymning far-shooting Apollo . . .

The shift from *I* to *we* is not noticed by commentators, I suppose on the grounds that such an alternation between singular and plural is meaningless in later literature.<sup>3</sup> Yet, coming from the lips of a Homerid, it seems to me of critical importance. The name Homeridae, whatever it means, must imply

1. Proclus actually misses the point of the remark by using τυφλὸν instead of the phrase τὰ ὁμματα πεπηρωμένον, implied above in his phrase ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὁμμάτων πηρώσεως (p. 26. 12).

2. Cf. *Vita Herodotea* 7–8, Wilamowitz p. 6. 1–20. References to the Lives are to Wilamowitz-Moellendorf's 1916 edition, *Vitae Homeri et Hesiodi* (No. 137 in the series “Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen und Übungen”).

3. See E. D. Floyd, “The Singular Uses of ἡμέτερος and

ἡμεῖς in Homer,” *Glotta*, XLVII (1969), 116–37. Floyd points out that in Homer ἡμέτερος may be used to refer to a single person and ἡμεῖς in the nominative is rarely used to give “to the passage in which it appears a special quality of either politeness or reticence” (p. 137). All other first person plural forms should be taken as retaining their plural force. If ἡμέων is correctly read at line 171, it would seem to clinch my point.

that those who so called themselves were, in some sense, followers of Homer. When a Homerid suggests the answer to the question, “Who is the ἡδιστος ἀοιδῶν?” it is natural for him to give the name of Homer—*il miglior fabbro*, to use T. S. Eliot’s phrase.

Cynaethus includes Homer and all the Homeridae in his shift from *I* to *we*. The difficulties in line 174 do not affect this point.<sup>4</sup> I assume Cynaethus promises that the Homeridae will carry the praise of the Deliades on their (well-attested) travels. This is more likely than that the Deliades will carry the praises of the Homeridae on unknown travels. The alternative reading ἡμέτερον, “we will carry *our* praise,” allows an

easy transition to ἐπὶ δὲ πείσονται, but seems inherently weaker. In each interpretation the Homeridae are referred to by a plural pronoun, as they carry Homer’s epics and their works on their travels.

Cynaethus, with his reference to Homer, reinforces the evidence that Homer, founder of the Homeridae, was blind and lived on Chios, at least in the later stages of his career. If we may judge from the present tense of οἰκεῖ, Cynaethus was a Homerid contemporary with Homer and offers contemporary evidence for the blindness.

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4. I ignore certain other textual points irrelevant to this discussion. However, one problem does bear on my point. At line 171 the MSS of Thucydides read ἀφίμως for ἀμφ’ ἡμέων

and there is a little support for ἀφ’ ὑμέων (as well as ἀφ’ ἡμέων). The dropping of ἡμέων from the text would weaken but not destroy my point (cf. n. 3).

### ARISTOTLE *METAPHYSICS* 13. 10. 1086b32–37

ἔτι δὲ οὐδ’ ἐπιστητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· οὐ γὰρ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· δηλον δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τῶν ὁρισμῶν, οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς, εἰ μὴ πᾶν τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, οὐδ’ ὅτι ὅδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶν  
[*Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b32–37].

The most recent translator, H. G. Apostle, has rendered this:

Moreover, (2) the elements will not be *knowable*; for they are not universal, but *knowledge* is of universals. This is clear from demonstrations and definitions; for there is no syllogism of the fact that this triangle has its angles equal to two right angles unless every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, nor of the fact that this man is animal unless every man is an animal.<sup>1</sup>

Paul Shorey (*CP*, VIII [1913], 90–92) argues that εἰ μὴ does not mean “unless” but “but that,” on the grounds that in the present passage Aristotle is concerned with the apodeictic syllogism which is of τὸ καθόλου (*An. post.* 75b21 ff.). Therefore, this passage cannot be translated so as to commit

Aristotle to a conclusion which is a singular proposition. W. D. Ross, whose translation does not differ substantially from Apostle’s, dismisses Shorey’s view, primarily on the grounds that Aristotle does in fact refer to syllogisms with singular premises (e.g. *An. pr.* 2. 27. 70a16 ff. or 1. 27. 43a37–40).<sup>2</sup> As we shall see, both Ross and Shorey have failed to take the exact meaning of συλλογισμὸς into account. To illustrate this, let us consider Apostle’s translation of οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί συλλογισμὸς ὅτι . . . as “for there is no syllogism of the fact that . . .”

Some years ago, the Loeb translation of Hugh Tredennick and the lectures of Richard Bosley suggested that συλλογισμὸς may be ambiguous.<sup>3</sup> If so, there is a simple explanation of Aristotle’s reference to a singular proposition in the passage above. Let us pause for a moment and consider the usage of the word “syllogism.” Roughly, the feature of the word that concerns us is that it belongs to a class of words which, when taken in the

1. H. G. Apostle (trans.), *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (Bloomington, 1970).

2. W. D. Ross (ed.), *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1970), II, 464.

3. Richard Bosley is the only commentator known to us

who takes the possible ambiguity discussed here seriously, although Tredennick does translate *Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b35 correctly. Since Tredennick does see that the proper translation must be “conclusion” here, we can only assume that his interpretation does not differ from ours.